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Abstract
This paper investigates two repercussions of the contingent convertible (CoCo) bond
bail-in framework: the agency costs and the resulting monitoring costs. For the rst, the
equityholdersbehaviour is analysed as a trade-o¤ between the value of the bank and the
risk taken by using an indi¤erence curve model. While the rst-best optimal risk maximises
the value of the bank, the equityholders select sub-optimally high risk level under bail-in
structures. This leads to both wealth transfer and value destruction agency costs. For
the second, the increased required rate of return by bondholders that reects the cost of
monitoring is shown to act as a Pigouvian taxon the equityholdersbehaviour. Utilising
this, we propose di¤erent types of covenants within CoCo bonds indenture as a solution to
the sub-optimal risk-taking behaviour.
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1 Introduction
The new nancial regulation aims to impose losses on bondholders on a going-concern basis
by the use of contingent convertible (CoCo) bonds. These are bonds that either convert to
equity or are written-down/o¤, when a banks capital ratio hits a pre-specied trigger ratio.
This formalises the deviation from absolute priority rule (DAPR), where under the absolute
priority rule (APR) bondholders do not bear losses until equityholders have been wiped out.
This paper focusses on the two of the consequences of the DAPR: the agency costs of the
bail-in structures, and the e¤ects of the resulting monitoring costs of the bondholders on the
equityholdersbehaviour.
The introduction of DAPR increases equityholdersincentive to loot, where the banks
wealth is extracted for the benet of a group of stakeholders (in the equityholderscase, for
example by unreasonably high dividend payouts), or to gamble-for-resurrection, where as a
last resort to revive a banks fortune, a high risk strategy is undertaken in the knowledge that
benets would accrue to the equityholders while the losses are mostly borne by the bondholders.
This is because the equityholders know their maximum loss is limited by the CoCo trigger (if
the bond is a write-down/o¤ type), or with further dilution (if the CoCo is an equity-conversion
type).1 These are behaviours recognised in the literature as agency costs, for which there are
broadly two types, the wealth transfer and the value destruction.2 These are typically identied
by the positive vega of the equityholdersposition3 (e.g. Berg and Kaserer (2011), Hori and
Martin Cerón (2017)). Here we develop a di¤erent approach using equityholdersindi¤erence
curves. This enables us to investigate the risk-taking behaviours of banks, both the rst-best
and the sub-optimal, and allows us to propose solutions for alleviating these agency costs.
1Note the equity-conversion CoCo bond is a non-admissible debt to equity swap (NADES), and thus the
dilution of shareholders is lower than it would be if they had to issue private equity at distressed share prices.
For an analysis of CoCo bond bail-in as a form of DES, see Hori and Martin Cerón (2017).
2See, for example, Berg and Kaserer (2011) (for wealth transfer) and Eberhart and Senbet (1993) (for value
destruction).
3Vega is the sensitivity of the value of an option, C, with respect to the volatility of the underlying asset
price, , V ega = @C
@
.
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More specically, a bail-out or a bail-in structure can be shown to be construed as a sale of
an option structure from the bondholders to the equityholders, where the buyer of the option,
the equityholders, have the right to choose its volatility. The question that can then be asked
is what the chosen level of volatility is, and how it is a¤ected by the new bail-in structures.
The vast theory of rm literature does not tell us how a rm selects its optimal level of risk.
As well established in the literature,4 under the APR the equityholders have a payo¤ structure
that is a call option (their loss is limited to their current position while the potential income
upside is unbounded). The positive vega position of an option means that the value of the
equityholdersposition increases as the volatility increases. There is, however, no solution to
the equityholdersoptimal risk selection problem. In this paper, we develop a model of rm
where a rms activities are a portfolio of correlated projects, with uncertain future values and
independent project-specic risks. Analogous to Markowitzs (1952) portfolio theory, there
is a concave risk-future value portfolio frontier (here termed project plans). The future
values are discounted at the required rate of return for the associated risk, leading to better
diversied project plans to be discounted at a lower rate. This results in a trade-o¤ between
the present value of the rm, V0, and its associated risk, . The rst-best optimal choice
of risk maximises the value of the rm. The equityholders choice of risk is determined by
their indi¤erence curves that is a loci of the pairs (V0; ) which yields the same present value
of their position. They choose the highest indi¤erence curve that is feasible with the rms
possible project plans, given by the one that is tangent to the project plans curve. Di¤erent
bail-out / bail-in schemes imply di¤erent set of indi¤erence curves, with steeper indi¤erence
curves yielding higher optimal risk choices and lower present values. Our analysis shows that
higher leverage means higher risk choice, and for reasonable levels of leverage, the equityholders
choose risks in the ascending order for the cases of no bail-in / bail-out (i.e. APR), bondholder
bail-in with equity-conversion CoCo bond and bail-in with write-o¤ CoCo bond. The choice of
higher volatility means a transfer of wealth from bondholders to equityholders (from the seller
of the option to the buyer), while non-value maximising choice means value destruction.
Given this result, the next question asked is whether there is a way of alleviating the equi-
tyholdersincentive for high risk-taking. Using the above model, we are able to show that by
4E.g. Jensen and Meckling (1976).
3
imposing higher required rate of return for higher risk-taking, the equityholders will rationally
reduce the risk-level chosen. In policy terms this is analogous to Pigouvian tax. The agency
costs are the negative externality of equityholdersactions on the remaining stakeholders of the
bank. By implementing higher costs on their action, the regulators can force the equityholders
to select less risky choice. Alternatively, leaving it to the bondholders, this is akin to them
demanding higher cost of debt, compensating them for their cost of needing to closely monitor
the credit quality of the rm.
We utilise this result to propose practical solutions to alleviate agency costs of CoCo bond
bail-in. Mirroring the practice in the corporate bond market, we suggest covenants as an
e¢ cient way for bondholders to monitor the credit quality and risk-taking prole of a bank.
Specically, we propose di¤erent types of covenants within the CoCo bond indentures. When
the banks solvency is reasonably high, we propose a ratchet coupon nancial accounting
covenant. With a rise in the leverage ratio (due to depleting equity capital) the ratchet is
triggered, automatically increasing the cost of debt and reducing the return on equity (ROE)
of the rm. More precisely, at each ratchet trigger point there is a step down in the ROE.
This introduces concavity in equityholdersreturn on equity (as opposed to convexity at the
CoCo trigger point), and this and the higher cost of capital once triggered (acting as Pigouvian
tax) discourage equityholders from taking higher risk. This type of covenants are argued to be
e¤ective when the rms solvency is high. In a falling solvency scenario we propose a di¤erent
type of covenants, specically asset sweep and debt sweep covenants. In the former the asset
is partially sold o¤ to pay down some of the debt, while in the latter newly issued debt is used
to repay existing debts. Both discourage (or prevent, in the case of debt sweep) equityholders
from piling on more debt to attempt "gamble-for-ressurection". The mechanisms of these
covenants are outlined in detail in the text.
So far the literature on agency costs associated with CoCo bond bail-in has focused mainly
on highlighting the over-investment problem (for example Berg and Kaserer (2011), Koziol and
Lawrenz (2012), Pennacchi, Vermaelen and Wolf (2014), Hilscher and Raviv (2014) and Hori
and Martin Cerón (2017)). None of these consider bondholdersmonitoring cost, ultimately
borne by equityholders via higher cost of capital, as a mean to alleviate the agency problem.
Jensen and Meckling (1976) investigates the role of monitoring cost in the context of a trade-o¤
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between rm value and non-pecuniary benet for the managers of a rm. Their indi¤erence
curve analysis is akin to the one developed here. In a wider sense, our model contributes to
the broader literature of theory of rm. Whereas previous works point out the positive vega
of the equityholdersposition as the root of a rms over-investment problem (e.g. Eberhart
and Senbet (1993), Berg and Kaserer (2011), Hori and Martin Cerón (2017)), which leaves the
question of Then why do rms not keep increasing its risk-taking?, our optimal risk model
is able to answer this question specically which leads to concrete policy suggestions.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 briey reviews the related literature, and
describes di¤erent bail-out / bail-in scenarios with their payo¤s and valuations. Section 3
develops the optimal risk model using indi¤erence curves and derives the main theoretical
results. In Section 4, we suggest a practical way of implementing these results by proposing
nancial and non-nancial covenants in the CoCo bond indenture. Finally, Section 5 gives
concluding remarks.
2 CoCo Bonds
Contingent convertible bonds, or CoCo bonds, are bonds that either convert to equity or are
written-down/o¤ when a banks capital ratio hits a trigger ratio. The bond is designed to
establish bail-inby the creditors, replacing bail-outby the government. This formalises
deviation from absolute priority rule (DAPR), where under the absolute priority rule (APR)
bondholders do not bear losses until equityholders have been wiped out.
CoCo bonds, initially termed reverse convertible debentures (RCDs), were rst recom-
mended by Flannery (2005). The idea was to counter a rms incentive to use tax-advantaged
debt rather than equity, that also reduces the rms ability to take losses. Flannery argued
that the issuance of RCDs would still maintain the tax advantage whilst reducing the latter
risk. In more recent terminology the suggested structure was an equity-conversion CoCo bond
with a market value trigger (explained below). In terms of post-trigger treatments there are
two types of CoCo bonds: equity-conversion, and write-down or write-o¤ bonds. In the former,
upon trigger CoCo bonds are converted into common equity,5 whilst in the latter, bonds are
5Co¤ee (2010) suggests a conversion into preference shares with cumulative dividends and voting rights, for
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either partially written down or wholly written o¤ to cover the incurred loss. For the trig-
ger mechanism, broadly two types are suggested in the literature: an accounting ratio trigger
and a market value trigger. Himmelberg and Tsyplakov (2011), Berg and Kaserer (2011) and
Hilscher and Raviv (2014) are examples of the former. However Flannery (2014), amongst
others, argues that accounting measures trail economic developments when a rm encounters
di¢ culties, and managers can manipulate accounting statements (p235). Pennacchi (2010),
Prescott (2011), Glasserman and Nouri (2012), Koziol and Lawrenz (2012) and Albul, Ja¤ee
and Tchistyi (2013) are examples that adopt the latter. In this case Sundaresan and Wang
(2014) point out that a market trigger bail-in does not lead to a unique competitive equilib-
rium. This problem arises from the fact that the share price reects both the current value of
the rm (say below the CoCo trigger value) and the post-bail-in value of shares (which would
then be above the trigger value). Many have sought solutions to this: Pennacchi (2010) by
including CoCo bond values in the capital ratios numerator; Prescott (2011) by introducing
a sliding conversion rule; Glasserman and Nouri (2012) argue that the multiple equilibria
problem is a feature of discrete-time models; Albul, Ja¤ee and Tchistyi (2013) achieve unique
equilibrium by placing the trigger directly on the asset value. However market value trigger
also su¤ers from the possibility of price manipulation; as suggested by Pennacchi, Vermaelen
and Wol¤ (2014), the nancial industry justies its objection to CoCos with market based
triggers on the basis of... manipulation/death spiral fears.(p550-1).6 In this paper we follow
the common market practice and focus on accounting capital ratio trigger CoCos.7
In this paper, we are interested in the equityholdersoptimal choice of project given their
payo¤s under di¤erent scenarios of bail-out / bail-in. The scenarios that we focus are: no
bail-out/in, government bail-out, bail-in with equity-conversion CoCo bonds, and bail-in with
write-o¤ CoCo bonds. We make use of the payo¤s derived and analysed in detail in Hori and
Martin Cerón (2017) for each of these cases in a simple rm nanced by common equity capital
and discount bonds (vanilla or CoCo). The summary of these are now reproduced below.
The set-up is as follows. The total face value of the bonds is F , which may include equity-
risk incentive reasons.
6See for example, Cocotrigger plan draws wary response, The Financial Times, April 4, 2011. Du¢ e
(2010) suggests using multiday average as a solution to this.
7McDonald (2011) suggests a dual price trigger that depends on both the banks share price and the value
of a market stock index.
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conversion CoCo bond (face value FC) or write-o¤CoCo bond (face value FW ). The face value
of the plain vanilla bond is FB. Therefore the rms have either F = FB (no bail-out/in or
government bail-out), F = FB + FC (equity-conversion CoCo bond bail-in) or F = FB + FW
(write-o¤ CoCo bond bail-in). The equity value at time 0 is E0. The total asset value at the
maturity of the bonds T is VT . All bail-outs / bail-ins trigger at a trigger capital ratio  .
There exists a minimum capital ratio E set by the regulator, where E >  . In all cases, where
possible, when bailed-out/in the equity is boosted to this minimum capital ratio E.
In the case that there is no bail-out / bail-in, the payo¤s to bondholders and equityholders
follow the absolute priority rule (APR), where the equityholders are rst wiped out before
bondholderspositions are a¤ected. As well established in the literature, the equityholders
payo¤ at T is that of a call option with strike price F , while the bondholders receive the bond
face value F unless they become the residual claimants when VT < F . These payo¤s can be
summarised as,
EN = max [VT   F; 0]
DN = min [VT ; F ] .
(1)
The Black-Scholes-Merton valuation of the debt and equity holdings at time t = 0 are (see for
example Merton (1974)),
V NE = C (F )
V ND = Fe
 rT   P (F )
(2)
where C (K) and P (K) are call and put option values with strike K given by
C (K) = V0N (d1 (K)) Ke rTN (d2 (K))
P (K) =  V0N ( d1 (K)) +Ke rTN ( d2 (K))
with d1 (K) =
ln

V0
K

+

r+
2
2

T

p
T
, d2 (K) = d1   
p
T ,
(3)
and r is the risk-free rate, T is the options time to maturity and  is the asset volatility.
Note that by the use of the put-call parity8 (see for example Hull (2017)), the equityholders
8The put-call parity states that for a non-dividend paying asset the following parity holds at time t  T ,
Pt (K) + St = Ct (K) +Ke
 r(T t),
where Pt (K) and Ct (K) are the prices of put and call options with strike price K and maturity T , St is the
7
position is equivalent to,
V NE = VT   Fe rT + P (F ) . (4)
In other words their position is protected by the put option P (F ) in the case that VT < F ,
provided by the bondholders.
In the case of a government bail-out, the APR is still followed, but once the capital ratio 
is breached the government injects common equity EG to ensure that the minimum common
capital ratio is maintained at E.9 The bondholders are fully protected at their face value F ,
and thus the balance sheet is restored to F1 E . The equityholdersand bondholderspayo¤s
are,
EBO = max [VT   F; 0]
DBO = F .
(5)
Their valuations at t = 0 are,
V BOE = C (F )
V BOD = Fe
 rT .
(6)
Comparing Eqn (6) with Eqn (2) suggests that, in government bail-out, the government re-
places the bondholders as the provider of the put option hedge P (F ) to the equityholders.
However the equityholders are no di¤erent with the government bail-out as they were with
no bail-out/in. This is so, as we are considering payo¤s at the bond maturity T . Hori and
Martin Cerón (2017) relaxes this assumption and considers the case where the rms solvency
is reviewed at t < T , in which case the equityholders also benet from the bail-out in cases
where the bank is otherwise insolvent.
With the equity-conversion CoCo bond bail-in, the CoCo bail-in is triggered when the
pre-conversion capital ratio falls below  . Where possible, the capital ratio is restored to E
with the converted equity. As opposed to the government bail-out case there is no external
capital injection, and therefore the balance sheet remains depleted. In this paper we assume
that, in the extreme case that the CoCo bond is not enough to cover the whole of the loss,
the regulator will exercise its bail-in power to convert the necessary plain vanilla debt into
price of the underlying asset, and Ke r(T t) is the price of a zero coupon bond with face value K and r is the
risk-free rate.
9Hori and Martin Cerón (2017) also considers the case of a government bail-out with preferece shares.
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ordinary shares to restore solvency.10 The equityholders are guaranteed the minimum of VT ,
at which point the CoCo conversion is triggered. The bondholders (vanilla and CoCo) hold
the remaining (1  )VT in the forms of either plain vanilla bond, unconverted CoCo bond or
CoCo-converted equity. The payo¤s at T are,
EC = max [VT   F; VT ]
DC = min [F; (1  )VT ] .
(7)
The valuations at t = 0 are,
V CE = C (F ) +
h
(1  )P

F
1 

  P (F )
i
V CD = Fe
 rT   (1  )P

F
1 

.
(8)
By using the put-call parity again, V CE can be rewritten as,
V CE = VT   Fe rT + (1  )P

F
1  

. (9)
Comparing this with Eqn (4) suggests that the equityholders are protected by an extra bear
spread-like position11 provided by the CoCo bondholders, on top of the put option P (F ),
(1  )P

F
1  

  P (F ) . (10)
Note that the expression in Eqn (10) is always positive.12
Finally, with the write-o¤ CoCo bond bail-in, unlike the equity-conversion CoCo bonds
case where the bonds are partially converted, here once triggered the whole of the CoCo bonds
are immediately written o¤.13 It is unclear what happens in reality to the remainder of the
written-o¤ bond when the write-o¤ more than covers the banks loss. Here it is assumed that
10 In Hori and Martin Cerón (2017), this case is termed equity-conversion CoCo bail-in-bail-in. Two other cases
of equity-conversion CoCo bail-in are also considered, namely bail-in-no-bail-out/in, where APR is restored once
all of the CoCo bond is used up to cover the loss, and bail-in-bail-out, where the government steps in to inject
common equity after all possible CoCo bail-in is exhausted.
11A bear spread is created by buying a put option at a higher strike price and selling a put option at a lower
strike price. The holder of the structure gains from a fall in the underlying asset price.
12See the proof of Prop 3 below.
13CoCo bonds which are partially written-o¤ are called the write-down CoCo bonds. For details see Hori and
Martin Cerón (2017).
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this net amount is added to the equityholdersposition as a contingent capital reserve. Then
there is a discontinuity in the payo¤s of the equityholders and the bondholders (vanilla plus
write-o¤CoCo bonds) at the trigger point which is represented by the indicator function below,
EW = max [VT   F; VT   FW ] + FWVT F1 
DW = min [F; (1  )VT + FW ]  FWVT F1 
(11)
where VT F1  is the indicator function,
VT F1  =
8<: 1 if VT  F1 0 if VT > F1  . (12)
Note as with the equity-conversion case above, a forced bail-in of vanilla bond is assumed when
whole of the write-o¤ CoCo bond is not enough to cover the loss. The values of these at t = 0
are,
V WE = C (F ) + FWBP

F
1 

 
h
P (F )  (1  )P

FB
1 
i
V WD = Fe
 rT   FWBP

F
1 

  (1  )P

FB
1 

,
(13)
where BP (K) is the price of a binary put option with unit payout at strike K,
BP (K) = e
 rTN ( d2 (K)) . (14)
In this case, the equityholders have an extra protection given by a condor-like position14, on
top of the put option P (F ) that is inherently present in the no bail-out/in and government
bail-out cases,
FWBP

F
1  

 

P (F )  (1  )P

FB
1  

. (15)
The equityholderspayo¤s for all four restructuring scenarios are depicted in Fig 1.
14A condor is created by a combination of a bull put spread with a bear put spread, where a bull put spread
is formed by buying a put option at a lower strike price and selling a put option at a higher strike price. A
holder of such a structure gains if the underlying asset price remains within a range.
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Figure 1: Equityholderspay-o¤s at time T under di¤erent bail-out/in scenarios
3 Indi¤erence Curve Analysis
Consider a bank that raises fund by equity and debt. The fund is invested in a portfolio of
projects, whose outcomes are uncertain. Then for risk-averse investors, the present value of the
banks asset value is estimated using an appropriate risk-adjusted discount rate. The optimal
portfolio decision is then dependent on the risk-return proles of the feasible project mixes.
In particular there may be a trade-o¤ between higher risk-taking, leading to a possible higher
expected outcome at maturity, and higher discounted rate. The current literature does not
provide an answer to how the bank would select its optimal portfolio under such scenario.
Here we build a model of a simple bank with two possible investment projects with uncertain
outcomes. Assuming su¢ ciently low correlation between the two outcomes, there is a risk-
diversication e¤ect in choosing a portfolio of the two projects. This results in a higher present
value of the portfolio due to a lower risk-adjusted rate required for discounting. Under a simple
condition then there exists an interior solution to the banks maximum value, which is the
banks rst-best choice of portfolio. However the decision of portfolio selection is taken by the
equityholders, whose convex payo¤ structure (they gain fully from the banks success, but their
loss is limited) means that their optimisation behaviour of the value of their holdings would lead
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to a sub-optimal choice of portfolio selection. This can be analysed using an indi¤erence curve
model, similar to that adopted by Jensen and Meckling (1976) in their analysis of monitoring
of the behaviour of the managers with non-pecuniary benets. The indi¤erence curves here
describe the trade-o¤ between risk (volatility) and value. The equityholderschoice of portfolio
is then given by the tangent point between the banks possible project portfolio frontier and
their highest attainable indi¤erence curve. We analyse these under di¤erent restructuring
scenarios of no bail-out/in, government bail-out, equity-conversion CoCo bond bail-in and
write-o¤ CoCo bond bail-in.
The set-up di¤ers from the traditional models in two ways. Firstly, it assumes the distri-
bution of possible future outcomes of projects to be given, which is then discounted to today
to estimate the present values. Thus the choice of projects a¤ect the present value, not only
through the chosen expected future value, but also via its e¤ect on the required discount rate.
This di¤ers from the Merton (1974) set-up, where the future values of a security is given as a
distribution of outcomes given todays value of the security.15 Secondly the model contrasts
with the CAPM set-up where the securities are priced assuming that all of idiosyncratic risk
have been diversied away, which cannot be assumed for the limited number of possible projects
available to a bank.
3.1 Banks Project Plans
The bank has two possible projects, i = 1; 2, both of which mature at T . Their expected value
and variance are given by E

V iT

and 2i , with correlation . A project planis given by the
weights (w; 1  w) of the two projects, and has the expected value and the variance,
E [VT (w)] = wE

V 1T

+ (1  w)E V 2T 
2 (w) = w221 + (1  w)2 22 + 2w (1  w) 12.
(16)
15Jensen and Meckling (1976) make the same point when they state, While we used the option pricing model
above to motivate the discussion and provide some intuitive understanding of the incentives facing the equity
holders, the option pricing solutions of Black and Scholes (1973) do not apply when incentive e¤ects cause V
to be a function of the debt/equity ratio as it is in general and in this example. Long (1974) points out this
di¢ culty with respect to the usefullness of the model in the context of tax subsidies on interest and bankruptcy
cost. The results of Merton (1974) and Galai and Masulis (1976) must be interpreted with care since the
solutions are strictly incorrect in the contect of tax subsidies and/or agency costs.
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Figure 2: Expected bank value E [VT ] for di¤erent values of w
Assume project 1 is riskier than project 2, i.e. E

V 1T

> E

V 2T

and 1 > 2. Then in
minimising 2 (w) with respect to w 2 (0; 1), for low enough , namely  2
h
 1; 21

, there
exists a minimum-variance plan wmin with min < 2 given by,
wmin =
22 12
21+
2
2 212
min =  (wmin) =
(1 2)2122
21+
2
2 212
.
(17)
Project plans w 2 [wmin; 1] then represent the set of e¢ cient plans,16 with  2 [min; 1]. In
this region then,
d
dw
> 0 for  2 (min; 1] (18)
where
d
dw
=
1


w21   (1  w)22 + (1  2w) 12

. (19)
Fig 2 depicts the graph of E [VT ] for di¤erent values of w 2 [0; 1], with its minimum-variance
plan and the e¢ cient plans on the upper branch.
The bank discounts its chosen project plan at the risk-adjusted rate r (w;  (w)), where
16An e¢ cient plan is one that attains the highest expected value E [VT (w)] for a given risk  (w), or equiva-
lently, that attains the given expected value with the lowest risk.
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dr
d > 0. Therefore the current market value of the bank is given by,
V0 (w) = e
 r(w;(w))TE [VT (w)] . (20)
3.2 The First-best Optimal Plan
The rst-best optimal plan for the bank is w such that
w = arg max
w2[wmin;1]
V0 (w) . (21)
To nd the optimal plan we compute and equate to zero the derivative,
dV0
dw
(w) =  T dr
dw
e r(w;(w))TE [VT (w)] + e r(w;(w))T
 
E

V 1T
  E V 2T  . (22)
To rule out corner solutions, we require dV0dw (wmin) > 0 and
dV0
dw (1) < 0. In particular, for the
case r (w;  (w))  r ( (w))) drdw = drd ddw , as ddw = 0 at w = wmin,
dV0
dw
(wmin) = e
 r(min)T  E V 1T   E V 2T  > 0. (23)
As this is strictly positive the solution cannot be at this point, i.e. w > wmin. At w = 1, as
then E [VT (1)] = E

V 1T

,  (1) = 1 and ddw (1) = 1   2,
dV0
dw
(1) = e r(1;1)T

 T dr
d
(1   2)E

V 1T

+
 
E

V 1T
  E V 2T  . (24)
Then for an interior solution w that satises
dV0
dw
(w) = 0, (25)
we require dV0dw (1) < 0, i.e.
E

V 1T
  E V 2T 
T (1   2)E

V 1T
 < dr
d
(1) . (26)
What condition (26) implies is that, for an internal solution, the project plan risk needs to be
su¢ ciently costly (the right-hand side is large), or else the bank would simply choose w = 1
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Figure 3: Banks present value V0 for di¤erent values of w
and only invest in the project with the higher expected value. Fig 3 depicts the graph of the
present value V0 in Eqn (20) given that condition (26) is satised. The optimal plan w is
given by the curves maximum point.17
Example 1 (Constant Market Price of Risk)
r (w;  (w)) = rf +  (w) . (27)
where  is the constant market price of risk and rf is the market risk-free rate. Then drdw = 0
and drd = , and so an internal solution exists for  >
E[V 1T ] E[V 2T ]
T (1 2)E[V 1T ]
.
Example 2 (Linear Average Market Price of Risk)
r (w;  (w)) = rf +  (w) (w) . (28)
where  (w) is given by the weighted average of the respective market prices of risk of the two
projects, 1 and 2,
 (w) = w1 + (1  w)2. (29)
For our numerical analyses in this section we use the linear average market price of risk
given in Example 2.
17Fig 3 is simluated using the linear average market price of risk case given in Example 2 below.
15
3.2.1 Discussion: The CAPM
As opposed to the above examples, in the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) the risk-
adjusted rate of return is linear in w,
r (w) = wE [r1] + (1  w)E [r2] = rf + [w1 + (1  w)2]MRP (30)
where MRP is the market risk premium, MRP = E [rM ]   rf , and E [rM ] is the expected
market return rate. In this case then, drdw = (1   2)MRP , and so,
dV0
dw
(w) =  T (1   2)MRP e r(w)TE [VT (w)] + e r(w)T
 
E

V 1T
  E V 2T  , (31)
for which,
dV0
dw (1) =  T (1   2)MRP e E[r1]TE

V 1T

+ e E[r1]T
 
E

V 1T
  E V 2T 
= [1  T (1   2)MRP ] e E[r1]TE

V 1T
  e E[r1]TE V 2T 
 e T (1 2)MRP  e E[r1]TE V 1T   eT (1 2)MRP e E[r1]TE V 2T 
= e T (1 2)MRP
 
V 10   V 20

.
(32)
This is positive assuming V 10 > V
2
0 . Hence there is no internal solution for the optimal plan
for the bank. Specically, the bank would always simply choose the riskier project 1.
The reason for this is that, with the CAPM, the project-specic idiosyncratic risks are
assumed to have been diversied away. In contrast, in the constant and linear average  exam-
ples above, for  low enough there is enough risk-diversication e¤ect such that a combination
of the two projects would have a higher present value than the present values of the single
projects, due to the lower risk-adjusted discount rate.
3.3 EquityholdersChoice of Risk
In the above section we established the banks rst-best choice of risk. However, it is the
equityholders who choose the banks project plan.18 In this section we investigate their choice
18Here we ignore the principal-agent problem between the equityholders (principals) and the managers
(agents).
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under the di¤erent restructuring scenarios.
3.3.1 No Bail-out/in and Government Bail-out
As discussed in Section 2, the equityholderspayo¤ at T is the same under the cases of no
bail-out/in and the government bail-out, where their payo¤ equals that of a call option with
strike price F . The value of this is given by the familiar Black-Scholes option pricing formula
in Eqns (2) and (6),
V NE = C (F ) (33)
where C (F ) is given by Eqn (3).
The equityholders indi¤erence curves (ICs) are dened as the loci of pairs (V0; ) that
yields the same value of V NE , i.e. all values of V0 and  such that,
V NE (V0; ) = V (34)
for a given value of V . We list some properties of the ICs:
Properties 1 (EquityholdersIndi¤erence Curves) The ICs have the following proper-
ties:
1. The ICs are downward-sloping.
2. The ICs are quasi-concave.
3. Given V NE , the IC steepens as F increases, pivoted at  =1.
Proof. From the denition of the ICs,
dV NE =
@V NE
@V0
dV0 +
@V NE
@ d = 0
, dV0d =  
@V NE =@
@V NE =@V0
=  vegaN
N
= MRSN .
(35)
MRS is the marginal rate of substitution between V0 and  along the IC, and,
N = N (d1)
vegaN = V0
p
TN 0 (d1) .
(36)
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Immediately, ICs are downward-sloping as both N and vegaN are strictly positive,
MRSN =  V0
p
TN 0 (d1)
N (d1)
< 0. (37)
To check the curvature of the ICs, consider the limits of . First when it becomes large, using
the limiting properties of call option values outlined in Properties B1 of Appendix B,
lim
!1V
N
E = V0 (38)
i.e. the equityholdersposition approximates the asset value. Therefore at this point = 1 and
vega = 0, and hence MRSN ! 0 as  becomes large. At the other limit when  approaches
zero, again from Property B1,
lim
!0
V NE = max

V0   Fe rT ; 0

. (39)
On an IC where V NE > 0 then, V0 must unambiguously be greater than Fe
 rT as  ! 0.
Therefore, at this point the equityholders position approximates the value of the forward
V0   Fe rT , and thus again  = 1 and vega = 0, making MRSN ! 0 as  ! 0. Given
that MRSN < 0 for  2 (0;1), the curves must therefore be quasi-concave.19 Finally, as F
increases V0 has to adjust in order to keep V NE constant for given ,
dV NE =
@V NE
@F dF +
@V NE
@V0
dV0 = 0
, dV0dF =  
@V NE =@F
@V NE =@V0
= e
 rTN(d2)
N(d1)
> 0 for  <1.
(41)
Thus the IC shifts up. To show that this shift is a steepening of the curve pivoted at  =1,
19The curvature of the ICs is given by,
d2V0
d2
=  V0
p
T

N 0 (d1)
N (d1)
"
N 0 (d1)
N (d1)
+ d2
2
+ d2
p
T
#
. (40)
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Figure 4: Equityholdersindi¤erence curves for di¤erent debt levels F for constant V NE
note rst that lim!1 dV0dF = 0. At any other values of ,
dMRSN
dF =
@MRSN
@F +
@MRSN
@V0
dV0
dF
=
h
  V0F N
0(d1)
N(d1)

d1 +
N 0(d1)
N(d1)
i
+
h
N 0(d1)
N(d1)

d2 +
N 0(d1)
N(d1)
i
e rTN(d2)
N(d1)
=   N 0(d1)N(d1)
h
V NE
FN(d1)

d1 +
N 0(d1)
N(d1)

+ 
p
T e
 rTN(d2)
N(d1)
i
< 0.
(42)
The nal line is negative 8 < 1 as each term within it are positive except for d1, and
xN (x) +N 0 (x) > 0 8x which is shown in Property A2 of Appendix A. Thus the ICs steepens
as F increases.
These properties are demonstrated in Fig 4. Intuitively, what Property 1 states is as
follows. Firstly, for equityholders there is a trade-o¤ between the present value of the banks
project plan, V0, and its volatility, . In fact there is a continuum of pairs of (V0; ) for which
the value of the equityholdersposition V NE (V0; ) is the same. This is the downward-sloping
indi¤erence curve. Secondly, the marginal value of  is higher for medium values of  than
for extreme values. This means that the equityholders are willing to give up more of V0 in
exchange for higher , i.e. the ICs are steeper, for those values of . This makes the shape of
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Figure 5: Equityholders optimal choice with (i) no bail-out/in, and (ii) equity-conversion
CoCo bail-in.
ICs quasi-concave. Finally, the higher the liability raised by debt, the lower the value of rm
claimed by the equityholders, and therefore for a given level of risk, the higher the level of V0
required for them to attain the same level of V NE . This is shown by the steepening ICs.
The equityholdersoptimisation problem is the selection of the highest attainable indi¤er-
ence curve given project plans (20). Diagrammatically, the solution is given by the tangent
point, as shown in Fig 5. The graph suggests that the equityholders would choose a higher
risk project plan wN than the banks rst-best choice w. More formally,
Proposition 1 wN > w.
Proof. The equityholderschoice of the optimal project plan is determined by,
max
w2[wmin;1]
V NE = C (F ) subject to V0 (w) = e
 r(w;(w))TE [VT (w)] . (43)
The solution wN is the w that satises,
dV NE
dw
(w) =
@V NE
@V0
dV0
dw
+
@V NE
@
d
dw
= N (d1 (F ))
dV0
dw
(w) + V0
p
TN 0 (d1 (F ))
d
dw
(w) = 0. (44)
However at w, we know from Eqn (25) that dV0dw (w
) = 0. On the other hand ddw > 0 for
w 2 [wmin; 1], and hence dV
N
E
dw > 0 at w
. Therefore wN > w.
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The indi¤erence curve analysis is particularly useful as it demonstrates clearly the agency
costs associated with having the equityholders as the decision maker of rms risk-taking. As
proved the equityholders select a higher risk project plan wN compared with the rm value
maximising w. Immediately then, by equityholders optimising the value of their holdings and
not that of the rm, it results in value destruction of the rm. This is one type of agency
costs. The other type is the wealth transfer. The equityholdersposition is a long call option
as given above, the value of which increases with the increase in the risk chosen. In contrast,
for the no bail-out/in scenario the bondholders hold a short put option, as seen in Eqn (2),
V ND = Fe
 rT   P (F ) (45)
where P (F ) is given by Eqn (3). Put-call parity20 implies that V ND decreases by the same
amount as the increase in V NE with the increase in the risk. The equityholders choice of
wN away from the rst-best w therefore results in the wealth being transferred from the
bondholders to the equityholders. On the other hand, in the government bail-out scenario, the
bondholders are una¤ected as they are guaranteed at F as was shown in Eqn (5),
V BOD = Fe
 rT . (46)
In this case then the wealth transfer is from the taxpayers to the equityholders.
Note, here it is assumed that the government bail-out takes the form of common shares
capital injection. Another possibility would be for the capital injection to be in the form of
preference shares. This will have two opposing e¤ects on the equityholders position. The
positive e¤ect is that of smaller (or no) dilution. The negative e¤ect is that of a reduced
claim on the asset, due to higher ranking of preference shares. Hori and Martin Cerón (2017)
shows that, in its set-up, the positive e¤ect always outweighs the negative, and therefore the
equityholders take higher risks with the preference shares bail-out. We expect the same in this
papers set-up.
20The put-call parity states that, for a non-dividend paying underlying asset, the value of a call option plus
a bond equals the value of a put option plus the underlying asset, i.e. C (K) +Ke rT = P (K) + S. As values
of the bond or the underlying asset do not depend on the volatility of the underlying asset price, an increase in
the volatility therefore must induce the same increase in the values of the call and the put options.
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We can also state the following for the no bail-out/in and common shares government
bail-out schemes:
Proposition 2 The risk-taking is higher, the higher the leverage.
Proof. This follows immediately from the third property of Properties 1 - the steeper the IC,
the further along to the right the tangent point is in Fig 5.
This implies higher agency costs for higher leveraged banks.
3.3.2 Equity-conversion CoCo Bond Bail-in
We apply the same analysis to equity-conversion CoCo bond bail-in. We established in Eqn
(8) that the value of equityholdersposition when the bank has issued equity-conversion CoCo
bonds is,
V CE = C (F ) +

(1  )P

F
1  

  P (F )

. (47)
The equityholdersproject plan choice wC is then determined by,
max
w2[wmin;1]
V CE subject to V0 (w) = e
 r(w;(w))TE [VT (w)] . (48)
Firstly,
Proposition 3 For V0 > F1  , the IC for equity-conversion CoCo bond bail-in is below the IC
for no bail-out/in with the same equityholdersvalue, V NE = V
C
E .
Proof. Consider the ICs, ICN and ICC , with the same values for equityholders V NE = V
C
E > 0.
First investigate what happens when  ! 0. Applying Properties B1 in Appendix B, when
V0 >
F
1  ,
lim
!0
V NE = lim
!0
V CE = V0   Fe rT . (49)
Hence V N0 (0) = V
C
0 (0) at  = 0, where V
N
0 () and V
C
0 () are the values of V0 required to
attain a given equityholdersvalue V NE when the volatility is . Similarly for  ! 1, again
using Properties B1,
lim
!1V
N
E = lim!1V
C
E = V0, (50)
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Figure 6: Equityholdersindi¤erence curves for (i) no bail-out/in and (ii) bail-in cases
and thus V N0 (1) = V C0 (1) at  =1. Finally for  2 (0;1), note that
(1  )P

F
1  

  P (F ) > 0 8 2 (0;1) , (51)
as (1  ) max
h
F
1    V0; 0
i
= max [F   (1  )V0; 0] > max [F   V0; 0] at all values of V0.
Thus to equate V CE with V
N
E for a given  2 (0;1), V C0 () must be smaller than V N0 ().
The proposition states that in order to attain the same equityholdersvalue V NE = V
C
E , the
equityholders are able to choose a lower V0 (w) for a given  under equity-conversion CoCo
bond bail-in than under no bail-out/in. The condition V0 > F1  assures that the rm is not
already in distress at time 0. Fig 6 demonstrates this result.
Secondly, Fig 5 suggests that the equityholders would choose a higher risk project plan wC
under equity-conversion CoCo bond bail-in than wN under no bail-out/in:
Proposition 4 wC > wN .
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Proof. From Eqn (44), the solution wN satises,
dV NE
dw
 
wN

=
@V NE
@V0
dV0
dw
 
wN

+
@V NE
@
d
dw
 
wN

= 0
, dV0
dw
 
wN

=  vega
N
E
NE
d
dw
 
wN

. (52)
Similarly, the solution wC for Eqn (48) satises,
dV CE
dw
 
wC

=
@V CE
@V0
dV0
dw
 
wC

+
@V CE
@
d
dw
 
wC

= CE 
dV0
dw
 
wC

+ vegaCE 
d
dw
 
wC

= 0. (53)
Now at wN , using Eqn (52),
dV CE
dw
 
wN

= vegaNE

 
C
E
NE
+
vegaCE
vegaNE

d
dw
 
wN

. (54)
However, Appendix C shows that, when V0 > F1  , 
C
E < 
N
E and vega
C
E > vega
N
E . Hence,
vegaCE
vegaNE
> 1 >
CE
NE
) dV
C
E
dw
 
wN

> 0. (55)
Thus at w = wN the equityholders will still be able to increase its value by increasing.w. Hence
wC > wN .21
As demonstrated in Fig 5, this means that under equity-conversion CoCo bond bail-in, the
equityholders would choose an e¢ cient project plan with higher  but lower V0, implying an
aggravation of both wealth transfer and value destruction agency costs compared with the case
of no bail-out/in.
21An alternative intuitive proof is as follows. As already discussed the equityholdersposition under equity-
conversion CoCo bond bail-in is the no bail-out/in position V NE = C (F ) plus a long put bear spread-like
structure (1  )P

F
1 

  P (F ), which represents the CoCo bail-in guarantee. For the range of values of V0
and F that we are interested, the delta of this long put bear spread is negative. The vega of a put bear spread
is always positive. This implies that CE < 
N
E and vega
C
E > vega
N
E . In Eqn (35) we derived that the slope of
the IC is the MRS which is the negative of the ratio of vega to delta. Therefore MRSC is more negative than
MRSN , implying a steeper IC under bail-in than under no bail-out/in. Thus wC > wN .
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3.3.3 Write-o¤ CoCo Bond Bail-in
Finally, we consider the write-o¤ CoCo bond bail-in. In Eqn (8), we derived the value of
equityholdersposition (the total of the original capital and the post-trigger contingent capital
reserve) as,
V WE = C (F ) + FWBP

F
1  

 

P (F )  (1  )P

FB
1  

. (56)
The equityholdersproject plan choice wW is determined by,
max
w2[wmin;1]
V WE = C (F ) + FWBP

F
1  

 

P (F )  (1  )P

FB
1  

(57)
subject to V0 (w) = e r(w;(w))TE [VT (w)] .
Then,
Proposition 5 wW > wN .
Proof. Very similar to the proof of Proposition 4.
3.4 Simulated Results
To compare the outcomes between the di¤erent restructuring structures, we simulate the op-
timal risk chosen by the equityholders under the di¤erent structures for varying values of F .
This is done by numerically solving the equityholdersmaximisation problems for each scenario,
namely Eqns (43), (48) and (57), using Newton-Raphson numerical estimation to solve for the
values w such that dV
X
E
dw = 0 for X 2 fN;C;Wg. This is then applied to (16) to compute
the optimal X (w). The values used for the simulation are: E

V 1T

= 130, E

V 2T

= 115,
1 = 30%, 2 = 20%,  = 0, 1 = 0:5, 2 = 0:25, T = 1 and rf = 3%. Where required, the
level of CoCo bond is assumed to be 10% of the total debt level, with the CoCo trigger level
 = 7%. The minimum capital ratio is E = 10%. Given these volatilities and the market price
of risk, the present values of the two projects are V 10 = 108:6 and V
2
0 = 106:2. The simulated
results for the optimal  (w) are shown in Table 1. The graph of the results are plotted in Fig
7.
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F First-best No bail-out/in Equity-conversion CoCo Write-o¤ CoCo
30 19:36% 19:36% 19:36% 19:36%
35 19:36% 19:36% 19:36% 19:36%
40 19:36% 19:36% 19:36% 19:36%
45 19:36% 19:36% 19:36% 19:36%
50 19:36% 19:36% 19:36% 19:36%
55 19:36% 19:36% 19:37% 19:37%
60 19:36% 19:37% 19:40% 19:43%
65 19:36% 19:40% 19:49% 19:57%
70 19:36% 19:50% 19:74% 19:93%
75 19:36% 19:75% 20:34% 20:37%
80 19:36% 20:34% 21:86% 22:49%
85 19:36% 21:81% 26:12% 26:30%
90 19:36% 26:45% 33:63% 32:41%
95 19:36% 36:00% 39:95% 38:34%
Table 1: Simulated results for equityholdersrisk choice for di¤erent leverage
The simulated results suggest the following,
 For low leverage, the risk chosen approaches the rst-best.
 For higher leverage, the equityholders choose the risks in the ascending order of no bail-
out/in, equity-conversion CoCo bond bail-in and write-o¤ CoCo bond bail-in.
 For very high leverage, the equity-conversion CoCo bond bail-in induces higher risk-
taking than the write-o¤ CoCo bond bail-in.
The explanation for the last point is as follows. In the write-o¤ CoCo bond bail-in, the
jump up in the payo¤ for the equityholders at the strike price F1  due to the binary put (as
shown in Eqn (56) and Fig 1) implies that, close to the strike price, the equityholders would
actually prefer not to have high volatility as it reduces the probability of ending up with a
high payo¤ (within the triangle area in Fig 1). This reduces the incentive for high risk-taking
in high-leverage cases for the write-o¤ CoCo bond bail-in structure.
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Figure 7: Equityholderschosen risk for di¤erent leverage
3.5 Falling Capital Ratio
Up to this point, we have been investigating the equityholderschoice of risk given the set of
possible projects, E

V iT

. In this section we investigate what happens under a falling capital
ratio scenario. We do this by introducing a factor   0, which represents an expansion
of the asset value if  > 1 and a contraction if  2 [0; 1). Then for the no bail-out/in or
government bail-out cases, the equityholderschoice of the optimal project plan is determined
by the following, which is Eqn (43) with the additional factor ,
max
w2[wmin;1]
V NE = C (F ) subject to V0 (w) = e
 r(w;(w))TE [VT (w)] . (58)
From Eqn (44) the solution w satises,
dV NE
dw
= N (d1)

dV0
dw
+ V0
p
T
N 0 (d1)
N (d1)
d
dw

= 0. (59)
In other words, the solution is where the slope of the project plan curve, dV0dw , equals the slope
of the IC,  V0
p
TN 0(d1)
N(d1)
d
dw ,
22 in the V0    plane. Then,
22See Eqn (37).
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Figure 8: Equityholderschoice with falling capital ratio: no bail-out/in
Proposition 6 Under the falling capital ratio scenario, the equityholders would increase their
risk-taking behaviour, i.e. @w
N
@ < 0.
Proof. See Appendix D.
Note @w
N
@ < 0 means that under contracting asset values, i.e. decreasing  value, w
N
increases, and hence the equityholdersrisk-taking increases. Figs 8 and 9 demonstrate this for
no bail-out/in and equity-conversion CoCo bond bail-in cases. For example in Fig 9, the face
values of the vanilla bonds and the CoCo bonds are xed at FB = 76 and FC = 4, respectively.
Initially the expected values of the two projects are E

V 1T

= 130 and E

V 2T

= 115. The
falling capital ratio is simulated as 2% and 4% falls in these expected values, which shift the
project plan curves down as shown. The equityholderschoices are again the tangent point
between the project plan curves and the highest attainable ICs, shown by the dots. The
simulated results demonstrate the equityholdersincreasingly risky choice as the capital ratio
falls: C increases from 21:8% to 22:8% to 24:3%. Similar results are attained for write-o¤
CoCo bond bail-in.
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Figure 9: Equityholderschoice with falling capital ratio: equity-conversion CoCo bail-in
3.6 Monitoring Costs in WACC
The inevitable agency costs of bail-in should encourage bondholders to monitor equityholders
behaviour. This results in monitoring costs to the bondholders. For example, a passive asset
manager who has been investing in nancial bonds for its index tracking portfolio now needs
fundamental analysts to monitor the credit quality of the banks. This is costly. Jensen and
Meckling (1976) argues that these monitoring costs are ultimately borne by equityholders via
higher weighted average cost of capital (WACC) demanded. The threat of the fall in the banks
value should in turn curb the banks risk-taking behaviour and discipline equityholders. In this
section we demonstrate this mechanism using the model developed above.
The rise in the return demanded by the investors, due to the monitoring costs, is here
represented by an increase in the market price of risk for the higher risk project 1 from 1
to 01. This is the higher WACC of choosing a higher proportion of the riskier project. As a
result, the present value of the project plans are reduced for riskier choices. This is depicted in
Fig 10 by the squeezingof the project plan curves. In again selecting the tangent point with
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Figure 10: E¤ect of Monitoring Costs on EquityholdersChoice of Risk
their ICs (here with equity-conversion CoCo bond bail-in), the equityholdersoptimal choice
of project plan is now of a lower risk.
In policy terms this is analogous to Pigouvian tax. The agency costs are the negative exter-
nality of equityholdersactions on the remaining stakeholders of the bank. By implementing
higher costs on their action, the regulators can force the equityholders to select less risky choice.
As a demonstration, Fig 11 simulates the resulting behaviour of the equityholders with vary-
ing degrees of proportional increase in 1, 1, when F = 80. It shows that with a su¢ cient
rise in the cost of choosing the riskier project, the equityholders can be made to choose the
rst-best risk level for all structures. For example with equity-conversion CoCo bond bail-in,
for the values 1 = 0:5 and 1 = 30% the equityholders would choose the risk level  = 21:9%
(the y-axis intercept). The simulation then suggests that a proportional increase in  of 15%,
which translates to an increase in project 1s required rate of return by 2:3%, would induce
the equityholders to choose the rst-best risk level of  = 19:4%. There is, however, a social
cost of the value of rm being lowered as a result, as shown in Fig 10.
More formally,
Proposition 7 The higher the required rate of return of the riskier project 1, the lower the
equityholderschoice of risk.
Proof. To show this, consider two downward-sloping curves as a function of a variable x,
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Figure 11: Risk chosen with monitoring costs
f (x;) and g (x).  is an exogenous parameter. Let the derivatives of the functions be such
that fx < 0, gx < 0, fxx < gxx, fxx < 0 and fx < 0. This implies that, (i) f (x;) is strictly
concave in x; (ii) g (x) is less concave than f (x) and can even be linear or convex; and (iii)
f (x;) becomes steeper (more downward-sloping) with an increase in . Let now x be the
value of x where the two curves are tangent, i.e. fx (x;) = gx (x). Then as  increases,
d
d
fx (x
;) = fxx
dx
d
+ fx. (60)
For the two curves to be tangent again, this must equal ddgx (x
) = gxx dx

d . Thus,
dx
d
=
fx
gxx   fxx < 0. (61)
This is negative from the conditions on the derivatives. Our tangency analysis between the
concave project plan curves (f (x;)) and the quasi-concave ICs (g (x)) satisfy these conditions,
where x =  and  = 1. Hence the choice of  decreases with higher 1.
The rise in the WACC required to attain the rst-best risk level depends on how far the
banks balance sheet is from the trigger level,
Proposition 8 The rise in the WACC required to induce equityholders to choose the rst-best
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Figure 12: 1 required for di¤erent values of : equity-conversion CoCo bond bail-in
risk level is smaller, the further away the bank is from the restructuring point.
Proof. This follows immediately from Proposition 6, where it was shown that the closer the
bank is to the trigger restructuring point, the further away the chosen risk is from the rst-best.
Hence a larger WACC rise is required.
Fig 12 demonstrates this for equity-conversion CoCo bond bail-in. As was introduced in
Section 3.5,   0 is a factor which represents expansion / contraction of the value of the
banks asset. The gure shows that for  =  4%, 1 of 21% is required to attain the rst-
best risk level of 19:4%, as opposed to 1 = 15% when there is no depletion in the value of
the asset.
Given these results, we can now propose nancial and non-nancial covenants as an e¤ective
way to articulate the monitoring e¤ort.
4 Covenants
We have established above that the agency costs can, to a certain extent, be mitigated by
rising required rate of return when riskier project plan is chosen. In practice this equates to
the bondholders demanding higher cost of debt to compensate for their monitoring cost. In
this section we propose covenants within the CoCo bond indentures to implement this idea.
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Covenants are regularly inserted in corporate bonds (especially from high yield issuers)
to monitor more e¤ectively the investment and nancial policies of the company. Corporate
covenants have been argued to successfully attenuate investment distortions and risk-taking
incentives in the corporate bond market, reducing agency costs between equityholders and
bondholders (see for example, Gamba and Triantis (2014)23). In a similar manner, we propose
covenants in the CoCo bond indentures to promote nancial and investment discipline in banks
to curb risk-taking appetite.
We suggest nancial accounting covenants with a ratchet coupon system whereby the
CoCo bond coupon rate gradually increases as the fundamentals of the bank debilitate and
the covenants are breached. The ratchet system suggested in the empirical literature for
corporate bond covenants (e.g. Bradley and Roberts (2004), Gamba and Triantis (2014)) tend
to indicate that the conventional covenants are usually xed at relatively low levels and fail
to exert the necessary nancial discipline on the company. Instead, introducing a ratchet with
di¤erent covenant levels enables the bondholders to monitor and control the banks risk-taking
more e¤ectively. With the rising risk-taking, bondholders are compensated through a coupon
increase that mirrors the increasing risk premium. The regulator, on the other hand, can
prevent equityholders from taking actions that would extract wealth from bondholders as the
solvency ratio falls towards the CoCo trigger or the point of no viability (PONV). The covenant
will exert discipline on managers and equityholders due to onerous coupon increases which will
automatically dent equityholdersreturns. Our result in Proposition 8 suggests that this type
of covenant based-discipline is more e¤ective during times of stable solvency, away from the
point of restructuring. Later, for covenants close to restructuring point, we suggest di¤erent
kind of covenants, namely asset sweep and debt sweep covenants.
4.1 Ratchet Coupon Financial Accounting Covenants
Following empirical evidence (e.g. Bradley and Roberts (2004), Billet, King and Mauer (2007),
Chava and Roberts (2008), Roberts and Su (2009), Gamba and Triantis (2014)) of covenants
on corporate bonds, we suggest three candidates for the index for the ratchet trigger in our
23They show how e¤ective debt covenant restrictions can shift shareholdersnancing and investments towards
value maximisation.
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proposed nancial accounting covenants:
 Fully loaded Core Tier 1 Ratio: CT1RWA
 Leverage Ratio: AssetsEquity+AT1 , where AT1 is the Tier 1 CoCo bonds
 Interest Coverage / ADI24 interest coverage: ADICoCo coupon payment
Financial accounting covenants are suggested, as it is di¢ cult to use income statement based
covenants due to the ongoing presence of exceptional and one-o¤ items in the banksprot and
loss account. The choice of the CT1 ratio would be a natural one, if the CoCo trigger is also
linked to the CT1 ratio, allowing bondholders to evaluate the degree of headroom against CoCo
trigger and coupon suspension on AT1s. The leverage ratio covenant would allow bondholders
to monitor banks indebtness to restrict balance sheet expansion and constrain managers to
constantly pursue equityholders-friendly investments.25 The interest coverage covenant (to
monitor the bu¤er on the coupon payments for AT1s) is a common covenant in corporate
bonds to assess the ability of the company to service its coupon payments. These covenants
would have to be calibrated to suit the nuances of each CoCo bond class. Specically, CoCo
T2s have a specic maturity and mandatory coupon payments, and hence the introduction of
covenants and ratchets would be easier as these bonds are similar to unsecured corporate bonds.
On the other hand, CoCo AT1s are perpetual and their coupons payments are not mandatory,26
and so imposing a ratchet covenant structure on these may be more challenging.27
Here we describe the covenants mechanism with a simple model using the leverage ratio-
based ratchet. Assume that the value of the asset At at period t 2 f0; 1g is the sum of the
equity Et, the plain vanilla bond Dt and the T2 CoCo bond Ct,
At = Et +Dt + Ct. (62)
24Maximum amount of distributable items linked to the holding company or the distance to coupon suspension
on the combined bu¤er (minimum CT1 including all additional bu¤ers).
25For example the sovereign bond carry trade, as sovereign bonds are zero risk weighted asset.
26AT1 CoCo bond coupons can be partially or totally suspended if there is not enough distributable amounts
within the equity (set by the MDA - maximum distributable amount) or if the combined bu¤er (made up of the
countercyclical, conservation and systemic equity bu¤ers) is breached.
27Specically, if the capital ratios fall below the Basel III combined bu¤er (the bu¤er above the minimum
capital ratio), the coupon payments can be reduced or even suspended. Furthermore, the indenture does not
contemplate any dividend stopper (CoCo bond coupons can be suspended whilst dividends are paid out) or
pushers (dividends payments can be resumed whilst CoCo bond coupons can still be missed).
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The leverage ratio Lt at period t is then,28
Lt =
At
Et
. (63)
Let the costs of debt of the plain vanilla bond and the CoCo bond be rD and rC , respectively,
and the return on asset be rA > 0. Then at the end of period 0, the rm produces the earnings
before interest and tax (EBIT) of rAA0. Assuming zero tax rate, the banks net income is
then,
n0 = rAA0   rDD0   rCC0. (64)
The banks return on equity (ROE) is,
rE =
n0
E0
. (65)
We assume that this net income is added to the banks capital in whole as retained earnings.
Period 1 asset and leverage ratio are then given by (62) and (63) above with no extra bond
funding D1 = D0 and C1 = C0, and
E1 = E0 + n0 and A1 = A0 + n0. (66)
This implies an increasing leverage ratio L1 = A1E1 <
A0
E0
= L0 for a prot-making bank with
n0 > 0.29
Consider now a new risky investment I0 at period 0 with an uncertain return erI . The
investment is funded by an increase in the plain vanilla bond issuance, I0 = D
0
0   D0. The
funding cost is assumed una¤ected at rD despite the increase in the leverage ratio to,
L
0
0 =
A00
E0
=
A0 + I
E0
. (67)
28The Basel III leverage ratio allows for the AT1 CoCo bond (e¤ectively a deeply perpetual subordinated
Tier 1 bond) to be included.
29E0 < A0 , A0E0 + n0E0 < A0E0 + n0A0 , A0+n0E0+n0 <
A0
E0
.
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The leverage ratio in period 1 is now,
L01 =
A0 + I + n0 + (erI   rD) I
E0 + n0 + (erI   rD) I = A1 + I + (erI   rD) IE1 + (erI   rD) I . (68)
The covenant species the ratchet trigger leverage ratios and the corresponding CoCo bond
coupon levels

Ki; riC
	
, i = 1; 2; :::, with L0 < K1 < K2 < ::: and rC < r1C < r
2
C < ::: .
Consider the rst trigger level K1. This is breached when L01  K1, or
rI  rD   E1K
1   (A1 + I)
(K1   1) I = r
1
I , (69)
where rI is the realised rate of return of erI and riI is the rate of return of the risky investment
corresponding to the ratchet trigger leverage ratio Ki, above which the ratchet trigger of the
CoCo bond coupon occurs. Note where the right-hand side is positive, this implies that the
ratchet would be triggered even when the risky investment returns a positive rate. Similarly,
the second ratchet is triggered if leverage ratio L01 breaches K2 also,
L01 =
A1 + I + (erI   rD) I    r1C   rCC0
E1 + (erI   rD) I    r1C   rCC0  K2, (70)
which now reects the extra coupon cost of the CoCo bond.30 In terms of the realised rate of
return, the CoCo coupon is ratcheted up to r2C when,
rI  rD  
E1K
2    r1C   rCC0K2   A1 + I    r1C   rCC0
(K2   1) I = r
2
I . (71)
What we are interested in is the equityholdersbehaviour. Their realised ROE depends on
the ratchet triggers,
r0E =
8>>>>>><>>>>>>:
rE + (rI   rD) IE0 , if r1I < rI
rE + (rI   rD) IE0  
 
r1C   rC

C0
E0
, if r2I < rI  r1I
rE + (rI   rD) IE0  
 
r2C   rC

C0
E0
, if r3I < rI  r2I
...
...
. (72)
30Here, for simplicity the higher coupon rate is applied to the whole period. The analysis is purely illustrative.
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Figure 13: ROE vs rI with Ratchet Coupon Covenant
Fig 13 depicts the e¤ect of the ratchet coupon covenant on the equityholders return. This
nancial accounting covenant encourages lower risk-taking through two channels. Firstly, the
step-down nature of the ROE as erI falls introduces concavity in the return prole of the
equityholders. In much the same way as the convexity in the equityholderspayo¤ at bail-
out / bail-in trigger points creates an incentive for higher risk-taking (due to a long vega
position), the concavity at the ratchet trigger points (short vega position) discourages risk-
taking. Secondly, once the ratchet is triggered, the higher CoCo coupon means higher cost
of debt for the bank, which leads to lower risk-taking as the equityholdersoptimal choice, as
discussed in Proposition 7. In terms of externality, this is analogous to extra Pigouvian tax
kicking in automatically.
However, both of these two channels become less e¤ective as the banks balance sheet nears
the PONV or the CoCo trigger. For the rst channel, this is because the concavity at the
ratchet triggers are o¤set by the convexity at the CoCo trigger. For the second channel, we
saw in Proposition 8 that the rise in the required rate of return required becomes increasingly
large to induce equityholders to behave optimally. Intuitively, the appeal of gamble-for-
resurrectionor lootingmore than o¤sets the e¤ectiveness of these covenants. We therefore
suggest introducing these nancial accounting covenants at the inception of CoCo bonds, when
the solvency ratio of the bank is healthy.
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4.2 Asset Sweep / Debt Sweep Covenants
In a falling solvency scenario where risk-taking incentives are high, we propose the following
types of covenants instead:
 Asset Sweep Covenant
 Debt Sweep Covenant
Asset sweeps are common in private debt placements (see for example Bradley and Roberts
(2004)). Once triggered, the bank is forced to sell assets to pay down debt, and thus decreas-
ing the leverage ratio. This prevents equityholders from liquidating assets to receive a large
dividend (looting), or take on new debt in order to nance a risky investment (gamble-for-
resurrection), reducing the agency costs of bail-in near the CoCo trigger point / PONV.
Let now  be the proportion of the asset A0 that has to be divested. We assume that the
whole of this is used to pay down the debt, in which case the debt is reduced to D01   A01.31
The bank will seek to sell those assets in which it can materialise a capital gain, i.e. b > 1,
where b is the ratio of the assets market value and its nominal value. The prot from this
divestiture is therefore (b  1)A01, which is added to the banks capital as retained earnings.
As a result, the equity is increased to E01 + (b  1)A01, while the nal value of the asset is
(1  )A01 + (b  1)A01 = [1 + (b  2)]A01. Therefore the banks leverage ratio becomes,
L01 =
[1 + (b  2)]A01
E01 + (b  1)A01
. (73)
This is smaller than A
0
1
E01
.32 When b < 2, the leverage ratio is reduced by both a lower numerator
(asset) and a higher denominator (equity). The trigger level A
0
1
E01
and the divestiture ratio  are
designed such that the leverage ratio is likely to be reduced to a maximum level desired by the
regulator, although this will depend on the capital gain ratio b. However, in the case that the
31Going forward, all unsecured debt, including senior debt, will be loss-absorbing. However, the regulator is
targeting a minimum loss absorbing capacity (TLAC). Since the regulator are unlikely to allow CoCo bonds or
any loss absorbing debt that makes up the TLAC to be repaid, we argue that the asset sweep should work for
any non-TLAC debt (both secured and unsecured).
32L01 is decreased for all values of b > 1, as
[1+(b 2)]A01
E01+(b 1)A01
<
A01
E01
, (b  2)E01 < (b  1)A01, which is true both
by b  2 < b  1 and E01 < A01.
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asset sale fails to reduce the leverage ratio to the desired level, the regulator can impose further
non-core asset sales and dividend / CoCo bond payouts cancellations33 to bolster solvency and
reduce the leverage ratio.
The debt sweep covenant resembles the asset sweep covenant, where any proceeds from
newly issued debts are used to repay existing debts, if the leverage ratio has breached a trigger
level. In our proposed covenant system, this can be the nal ratchet trigger level of our ratchet
coupon nancial accounting covenant. This sets a ceiling to a banks leverage ratio, curbing
equityholdersappetite for leveraging up as the banks solvency deteriorates.
We believe through a combination of these three types of CoCo covenants the agency costs
can be contained. Financial covenants are useful to keep risk and leverage appetite down
(especially in a low protability environment) from the bond inception, enabling bondholders
to monitor the banks and incorporate the increasing risk premium in the market price of
the bonds as soon as the risk prole of the bank creeps up. We have proposed a ratchet
coupon structure which we believe is an e¤ective way of doing this. Both asset and debt
sweep covenants contribute to the diminishing of the appetite for debt when risky investment
opportunities become more appealing for the bank, as they alleviate the incentives of the banks
to issue new debt to extract wealth from existing bondholders. These two covenants should be
triggered when the solvency ratios are decreasing (but still high enough34) and the nancial
covenants are no longer e¤ective near the PONV / CoCo trigger point.
5 Concluding Remarks
We have suggested that the new bail-in framework, achieved by the issuance of CoCo bonds,
will prove not to solve the moral hazard problem that is inherent in the old bail-out framework.
Instead, there are agency costs that lie behind the new relationship between equityholders and
bondholders. The deviation from absolute priority rule (DAPR), formalised by the bail-in
bonds, changes the prole of the trade-o¤ between value and risk for equityholders. This
was investigated using indi¤erence curve analysis, which demonstrated the higher risk-taking
33The bond indenture should contemplate this event, especially in AT1 CoCo bonds.
34We suggest, for example, 9% CT1.
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appetite for equityholders under equity-conversion CoCo bond and write-o¤ CoCo bond bail-
ins, relative to the no bail-in / bail-out and traditional government bail-out scenarios.
We also believe that covenants in CoCo bonds proposed in this paper are an e¤ective way to
curb risk-taking. When solvency is relatively high, contractual covenants that systematically
incorporate the additional risk premium via upward coupon resetting exert discipline on banks
and dent equityholder returns. The equityholders are not able to trade easily the bank value
o¤ against higher risk-taking for two reasons: the concave nature of the equityholdersreturn
on equity at each ratchet trigger point, and the higher cost of capital once triggered. However
as solvency deteriorates towards the point of no viability (PONV) or the CoCo trigger point,
these become less e¤ective mainly as the equityholdersincentive to gamble-for-resurrection
negate the above e¤ects. In these cases we propose a di¤erent type of covenants, namely asset
and debt sweeps. Further investigations of other solutions to alleviate moral hazard and agency
costs, especially near the PONV / CoCo trigger point, are forthcoming in future research.
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6 Appendix
A Properties of N (x)
N (x) is the cumulative distribution function for a standard normally distributed random
variable X  N (0; 1) such that N (x) = Pr (X  x). Then N 0 (x) is the probability density
function N 0 (x) = 1p
2
e 
X2
2 and N 00 (x) =  xN 0 (x).
Property A1
limx!1
N 0(x)
N(x) = 0
limx! 1
N 0(x)
N(x) =  x.
(74)
Proof. The rst limit is trivial as limx!1N 0 (x) = 0 and limx!1N (x) = 1. For the second,
note rst that limx! 1N 0 (x) = 0 and limx! 1N (x) = 0. The limit can therefore be found
using LHôpitals rule,
lim
x! 1
N 0 (x)
N (x)
= lim
x! 1
N 00 (x)
N 0 (x)
= lim
x! 1
 xN 0 (x)
N 0 (x)
=  x. (75)
Property A2
d
dx

N 0 (x)
N (x)

< 0 8x. (76)
Proof. Expanding,
d
dx

N 0 (x)
N (x)

=  xN
0 (x)
N (x)
 

N 0 (x)
N (x)
2
=  N
0 (x)
N (x)

xN (x) +N 0 (x)
N (x)

. (77)
This is negative if and only if xN (x) +N 0 (x) > 0. This is obvious for x  0. For x < 0, rst
check the limits,
limx!0 xN (x) +N 0 (x) = N 0 (0) = 1p2 > 0
limx! 1 xN (x) +N 0 (x) = limx! 1N (x)

x+ N
0(x)
N(x)

= 0
(78)
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using Property A1. Now,
d
dx
 
xN (x) +N 0 (x)

= N (x) + xN 0 (x)  xN 0 (x) = N (x) > 0 8x (79)
which proves that xN (x) +N 0 (x) > 0 8x < 0.
B Limiting Properties of Call and Put Options
Properties B1 (Properties at the limits of call and put option values)
1. For large ,
lim!1 d1 =1 ) lim!1N (d1) = 1
lim!1 d2 =  1 ) lim!1N (d2) = 0
9=;)
8<: lim!1C (K) = V0lim!1 P (K) = Ke rT : (80)
Therefore a call option behaves like the underlying asset while a put option behaves like
a bond.
2. For  ! 0,
lim
!0
d1 = lim
!0
d2 =
8>>><>>>:
 1 if V0 < Ke rT
0 if V0 = Ke rT
1 if V0 > Ke rT
) lim
!0
N (d1) = lim
!0
N (d2) =
8>>><>>>:
0
1
2
1
.
(81)
Thus,
lim!0C (K) = max

V0  Ke rT ; 0

lim!0 P (K) = max

Ke rT   V0; 0

.
(82)
Intuitively the options approximate their intrinsic values.
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C Comparing Delta and Vega
The value of equityholderspositions under no bail-out/in and equity-conversion CoCo bond
bail-in are given in Eqns (1) and (8) as,
V NE = C (F )
V CE = C (F ) +
h
(1  )P

F
1 

  P (F )
i
.
(83)
The delta and vega of these positions are given by the derivatives with respect to V0 and ,
respectively,
NE = N (d1 (F ))
CE =  + (1  )N

d1

F
1 

,
(84)
vegaNE = V0
p
TN 0 (d1 (F ))
vegaCE = (1  )V0
p
TN 0

d1

F
1 

.
(85)
First, we show that NE > 
C
E for values V0 >
F
1  . For this to be true, it must be that,
N (d1 (F )) >  + (1  )N

d1

F
1  

, N ( d1 (F )) < (1  )N

 d1

F
1  

. (86)
To show this, consider the following derivative:
@
@V0

N ( d1 (F ))  (1  )N

 d1

F
1  

=   1
V0
p
T

N 0 ( d1 (F ))  (1  )N 0

 d1

F
1  

. (87)
As N 0 ( d1 (:)) = N 0 (d1 (:)), this is positive if (1  )N 0

d1

F
1 

> N 0 (d1 (F )). For this
to be true, we require,
(1  ) e  12d21( F1  ) > e  12d21(F ). (88)
Now,
d1 (F ) = d1

F
1  

  1

p
T
ln (1  ) . (89)
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Hence,
e 
1
2
d21(F ) = e 
1
2
d21(
F
1  )e
  1
2
n
  2

p
T
ln(1 )d1( F1  )+ 12T [ln(1 )]
2
o
. (90)
Thus for Eqn (88) to be true,
1   > e 
1
2
n
  2

p
T
ln(1 )d1( F1  )+ 12T [ln(1 )]
2
o
, ln (1  ) > 1

p
T
ln (1  ) d1

F
1  

  1
22T
[ln (1  )]2
, 1 < 1

p
T
d1

F
1  

  1
22T
ln (1  ) (91)
, 1
2
p
T
ln (1  ) < d1

F
1  

  
p
T = d2

F
1  

.
Noting that ln (1  ) < 0 for  > 1, this is unambiguously satised when d2

F
1 

> 0 ,
V0 >
F
1  e
 

r 2
2

T
, or denitely when V0 is above the critical level F1  . Hence Eqn (87) is
positive for these values of V0. Also,
lim
Vo!1

N ( d1 (F ))  (1  )N

 d1

F
1  

= 0 (92)
as the limit for both terms are zero. This means that N ( d1 (F ))   (1  )N

 d1

F
1 

approaches 0 from below as V0 increases from F1  , proving that 
C
E < 
N
E for V0 >
F
1  .
Similarly, for vegaCE > vega
N
E when V0 >
F
1  , we require,
(1  )V0
p
TN 0

d1

F
1  

> V0
p
TN 0 (d1 (F )) . (93)
This is already proved above.
D Proof of Proposition 6
Consider the e¤ect of an increase in  on the rst-order condition Eqn (59),
@
@

dV NE
dw

= N 0 (d1)

dV0
dw
+ V0
p
T
N 0 (d1)
N (d1)
d
dw

+N (d1)
@
@

dV0
dw
+ V0
p
T
N 0 (d1)
N (d1)
d
dw

= N (d1)

@
@

dV0
dw

+
@V0
@
p
T
N 0 (d1)
N (d1)
d
dw

+ V0
p
T
@
@

N 0 (d1)
N (d1)

d
dw

.(94)
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Note, the rst term of the rst line is zero from Eqn (59). Now from V0 (w) = e r(w;(w))TE [VT (w)],
we have,
dV0
dw
= e rT

 T dr
dw
E [VT (w)] +
 
E

V 1T
  E V 2T ) @@

dV0
dw

=
1

dV0
dw
(95)
and
@V0
@
=
1

V0 ) @V0
@
p
T
N 0 (d1)
N (d1)
d
dw

=
1

V0
p
T
N 0 (d1)
N (d1)
d
dw

, (96)
and therefore,
@
@

dV0
dw

+
@V0
@
p
T
N 0 (d1)
N (d1)
d
dw

=
1


dV0
dw
+ V0
p
T
N 0 (d1)
N (d1)
d
dw

= 0, (97)
again from Eqn (59). Therefore,
@
@

dV NE
dw

= N (d1)V0
p
T
@
@

N 0 (d1)
N (d1)

d
dw
. (98)
However we know from Property A2 that ddx

N 0(x)
N(x)

< 0 8x. With all other terms positive,
this implies that @@

dV NE
dw

< 0. Hence with an increasing , w has to decrease to reattain
dV NE
dw = 0, and thus
@wN
@ < 0 as desired.
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